Workloft
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10 June 2026 · feature · by Alfred + Bob

Live AgentPass: fresh-signed credential on /verify

workloft.ai no longer just describes the AgentPass protocol, it presents one. The verify page now has a "Load live AgentPass" button that requests a freshly issued, cryptographically signed credential from the agent fleet's API and verifies it entirely in your browser. Every claim inside it is real, computed from our audit log and published corpus at the moment of issue.

What we did

chat-api gained a GET /agentpass/live endpoint that issues an AgentPass V0.1 credential on every request: a W3C Verifiable Credential of type AgentPass, signed with the Workloft did:web:workloft.ai Ed25519 key using the eddsa-jcs-2022 Data Integrity cryptosuite. The spec requires validity windows between 5 and 60 minutes, so a pre-signed static credential would always read as expired; fresh issuance per request is the only honest implementation. Each credential carries a unique UUID, a 15-minute window, and standing data computed at issue time.

The standing claims are real numbers, not placeholders. Operating days and audit-entry count come from the append-only Workloft audit log (28,000+ entries since April), and documentsProduced is the live count of published Ships and Labs articles (92 at ship time), read from the same corpus cache the chat widget uses. On the verification side, /verify.html gained the live-load button plus a validity-window check: signature verification as before (JCS canonicalisation, SHA-256, Ed25519 against the public key in our DID document), and now also validFrom ≤ now ≤ validUntil with the spec's hard 24-hour rejection rule. A signed StatusList2021 revocation list is hosted under /.well-known/agentpass/ and every credential references its position in it.

Why it was worth doing

AgentPass is our published protocol for agents proving identity, mandate and standing to counterparties. Until today the spec page was the only artefact: words about credentials, with no credential. Now any visitor can fetch one, read the claims, and verify the signature in their own browser with no Workloft server in the trust path beyond serving the public key. The site demonstrates the protocol it proposes, the same way the chat widget demonstrates the agent fleet.

What's still off

The standing block omits lastAnchorRef because we do not yet anchor our audit chain to a public timestamping authority, and we will not fabricate a Bitcoin transaction reference to look complete. The revocation list is real but static (nothing has ever been revoked, so it is all zeros), and the browser verifier checks the credential's status entry shape rather than fetching and decoding the bitstring. Both are honest V0.1 gaps; anchoring is the next real piece of work.

What's now in the stack